The trolley problem, which was coined by Judith Jarvis Thomson and first proposed by Phillipa Foot, and its variants, are one of the most well known ethical dilemmas. In the problem, you are essentially given the choice of taking an action which would sacrifice one, or in some cases a small number of people, for the good of the many. The original problem was whether a trolley driver should switch tracks to kill one person working on the tracks, or stay on the track he was on and kill five workers. Variations of this dilemma have various levels of involvement and responsibility. ‘The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas’ can be interpreted as a variation of the trolley problem. Either the child is left to suffer for the benefit of every citizen of Omelas, or the child is rescued and the utopia of Omelas would be gone. In this essay, I will argue that Omelas is a significantly more powerful moral dilemma which forces us to confront our own nature in a way that the trolley problem does not.
In the essay, Killing, Letting Die, and The Trolley Problem, by Judith Jarvis Thomson in which she coins the term ‘The Trolley Problem’, she discusses whether killing is morally worse than letting die, and how what is morally right or permissible can change due to the level of personal involvement and other factors, even if the outcome is the came either way. The conclusion she draws is that killing is generally worse than letting die, although, ‘...there are circumstances in which—even if it is true that killing is worse than letting die- one may choose to kill instead of letting die.’ Now, this isn’t a direct parallel with Omelas since in the story there is no killing or dying on either side. What Omelas does, as a trolley problem, is present us with something we’re far more likely to encounter in real life- happiness and misery. Another way they diverge is the question of where the citizens of Omelas would be in the trolley problem. It’s clear that the child is the single worker on the right hand track, but are the citizens the five tied to the tracks, or the driver? To me it seems that the people believe they are the ones tied to the tracks, the many that are saved by the sacrifice of the few. What they might not want to think about is the fact that they are also the driver, and they all have the power to turn the course of the trolley if they so choose. So, where are the ones who walk away?
The second major difference is the fact that the sacrifice is reversed. In every version of the trolley problem, the action that preserves the most lives is the one that relies on active participation or interference, and the one that demands no involvement at all is the option that sacrifices the most. The thing that makes the trolley problem such a powerful ethical dilemma is the action that is demanded of the ‘driver’, the person being questioned with this dilemma. Essentially, the choice between killing or letting die. If the track the trolley was headed towards only had one worker at risk and the track that could be diverted towards had five, there would be no debate at all. And yet, this is essentially the world that Omelas presents, where you could do nothing and thousands would benefit, or do something and thousands would suffer, and it is an equally if not more powerful moral dilemma. Is it that the child has ‘more claim’, as Thomson puts it, on happiness? Do the residents of Omelas deserve to have their utopia stripped away for the crime of allowing the child to suffer? Would it simply be returning order to the world, which should never have been upturned in the first place? Generally, people seem to agree that saving the child is at the least morally permissible, which highly contradicts utilitarian theories of morality. If this would condemn thousands of people to misery, why is it deemed to be a moral action? If this is a moral action then why is there a lack of people committing to wanting to save the child?
My next text, Revisiting External Validity: Concerns about Trolley Problems and Other Sacrificial Dilemmas in Moral Psychology, argues that ‘...sacrificial dilemmas may lack experimental, mundane, and psychological realism and therefore suffer from low external validity.’ Essentially, abstract and unrealistic hypotheticals such as the trolley problem are incapable of accurately reflecting the kind of rationales and actions humans take in real life ethical dilemmas. ‘[Their] apprehensions stem from three observations about trolley problems and other similar sacrificial dilemmas: (i) they are amusing rather than sobering, (ii) they are unrealistic and unrepresentative of the moral situations people encounter in the real world, and (iii) they do not elicit the same psychological processes as other moral situations.’ I would argue that the dilemma presented in Omelas is the answer to each of these qualms. Omelas is certainly sobering. One star reviews of the story accuse it of being too sobering. One reviewer called it ‘morally depraved and [lacking] lingering innocence [they] feel should be included’. Others called it ‘disturbing and depressing’ and claimed it made them feel ‘genuinely sick’. (taken from the Goodreads reviews.) You’d also be hard pressed to make the argument that Omelas does not reflect real world moral situations. The text is primarily understood to be a criticism of exploitation of underdeveloped countries at the hands of developed countries, a system that nearly every person in the world benefits or suffers from in one way or another. Even the descriptions of the whimsical utopia and bizarrely horrible conditions of the suffering child are not entirely unrealistic- the utopia is reminiscent of the Woodstock music festival and a hippie lifestyle, and the child brings to mind images of emaciated children from places such as Africa or South East Asia. And as for psychological realism, I would argue that this is where this text excels.
Psychological realism is whether or not the same psychological responses are elicited from a story or dilemma as they would in real life. I believe that psychological realism is exhibited both in the fictional world of Omelas and in the readers who are consuming the story as a moral dilemma akin to the Trolley Problem. Omelas is a realistic work of psychological fiction due to the believability of the Omelas residents’ psychological processes. They display some core human emotions and responses such as guilt, disgust, and self preservation. We can tell that every resident of Omelas truly enjoys their life in Omelas and they have no wish to sacrifice it. They do not enjoy the suffering of the child, but they will find some way to justify it to themselves, because their core desire for self preservation comes first. This touches on an aspect of human nature that isn’t fun to acknowledge. We’re an intelligent species and we love to believe that our choices and actions are based on intelligent decisions and morality. We want to believe that we have free will. But as shown by the people of Omelas, the things we think we believe out of facts and logic may actually just be whichever beliefs benefit us the most, with justifications cherry-picked by our subconscious absolve us of guilt.
We watch this happen in the minds of the people of Omelas. ‘...as time goes on they begin to realise that even if the child could be released, it would not get much good of its freedom: a little vague pleasure of warmth and food, no real doubt, but little more. It is too degraded and imbecile to know any real joy. It has been afraid too long ever to be free of fear. Its habits are too uncouth for it to respond to humane treatment. Indeed, after so long it would probably be wretched without walls about it to protect it, and darkness for its eyes, and its own excrement to sit in.’ Somehow, the people of Omelas are able to convince themselves that it would in fact be a detriment to the child to rescue it from the cellar, and that rescuing it would not do the child much good, or at least not enough to justify the sacrifice. This conclusion absolves them of the guilt of inaction. If there is nothing that can be done, then they have no moral obligation to do anything. This may sound like a pretty unfavourable analysis of human nature but unfortunately it seems to me that it is true, and the reason we own smartphones and wear mass produced clothing and eat meat. Most people are aware that child slave labour is responsible for constructing electrical components used in phones, mass produced clothing is made in sweatshops, and most meat comes from animals who are treated cruelly and killed inhumanely. When we look at the grand scheme of things, nearly every modern convenience we enjoy is at the expense of someone or something else, and yet we continue to consume. But we all need phones, and we can’t always afford ethically made garments, and the animals have already been killed anyway so we may as well eat their meat. And at least these processes are still creating jobs, jobs that might not be available otherwise to people in the impoverished nations where cobalt is mined and sweatshops operate. What would the people of Omelas think of us if they saw some of the justifications our people came up with? To answer the question at the end of the first section, the reason that people hold back from ever entirely condemning the people of Omelas or committing to rescuing the child, is that we understand on a subconscious level that to condemn Omelas is to condemn ourselves and each other.
Now that I’ve developed this connection, we can examine what it says about the ones who walk away from Omelas. The translation of ‘walking away’ to the real world is undefined and up for personal interpretation. Maybe it’s going off grid, or refusing to take part in consumerist culture. In a literal sense it could be moving to another country where exploitation is not so prevalent, or in a morbid sense, it could even be thought of as taking your own life, which is perhaps the only way to completely leave behind a world in which you benefit from exploitation. The lack of a clear path to walking away in real life as you can from Omelas was intentional. Omelas is not intended to give us any sort of answer. Le Guin herself probably doesn’t even have the answer.
The ambiguous nature of the text is intentional and a commentary of our own lives. There is no simple, straightforward answer. Walking away from Omelas does not do anything to alleviate the child’s suffering just like withholding from consuming products of exploitation does nothing to change global systems. This text is not supposed to give us any moral lesson or tell us what to do. All it does is encourages us to think about our own rationales and to be more self aware. This is what makes it such an impactful moral dilemma; there’s no easy answer, and maybe no answer at all. But it forces us to examine ourselves in a way that problems such as the trolley problem cannot.